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INTRODUCTION
Technology's fingerprints are found all over the recent financial
reporting scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Global
Crossing and the like. The firms caught up in the scandals were
disproportionately either in the technology sector or were
technology-driven competitors in related product markets. They
were especially attractive as investments to a generation of
investors using on-line brokerage accounts and financial
websites-an information-rich environment that promised to
empower the retail trader vis-&-vis the dominating mutual funds,
hedge funds, and pension plans.
Just as important, many of these firms were innovators in how
they used technology in both financing and conducting their
businesses. Enron is now the best-studied example,' with massive
utilization of structured finance techniques and derivatives to create
an "asset lite" strategy wherein both assets and liabilities were
quickly moved one step outside the formal boundaries of the firm to
numerous affiliated special purpose entities.2 These financing
techniques themselves would be impossible without sophisticated
technology that enabled Enron to become more an energy-based
investment bank than a traditional supplier of natural resources.
And even business-to-business relationships structured by many of
these firms were innovative, with firms using information and
communications technology to create more embedded relationships
with customers and suppliers characterized by "just in time"
production and delivery.
My claim is that the technology link to the recent disclosure
scandals is no coincidence.' To be sure, cheating tempts all who seek
1. For a good overview from an economic and accounting perspective, see Paul M. Healy
& Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2003).
2. The legal literature concerning Enron is rapidly becoming voluminous, both in terms
of official investigations and academic commentary. See generally WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET
AL., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL [NVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DJRECrORS OF
ENRON CORP., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (2002), available at http/news.findlaw.com/
hdocsldocs/enron/sicreport; Douglas M. Branson, Enron-When All Systems Fail: Creative
Destruction or Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 989 (2003);
William Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002).
3. For a pre-scandal paper drawing the connection between technological evolution and
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wealth, in whatever line of business they find themselves. I want to
show, however, how the rapid pace of innovation at a number of
levels offered motive, opportunity, and rationalization for a
downshift in financial reporting norms, which in turn made outright
fraud more probable.
Understanding the root causes of the scandals is important
because of the need for care in choosing a response. The popular
story of the scandals, born out of a great deal of frustration and
anger, is one of corporate greed-misreporting as a stark form
of corruption and hence "evil." While greed certainly had a role,
the misreporting was far more complicated and ambiguous, both
in terms of underlying motivation and its impact on investors.
Technology's multiple dimensions set in motion a feedback loop in
which many managers came to believe that aggressive reporting-
close to the line and perhaps over it-was both necessary and
justifiable. During most of the 1990s, the SEC and the courts did
relatively little in response-even though the practices were
becoming more and more notorious-thereby sending a message of
tacit acquiescence. Putting aside the most egregious cases, the story
may thus be more of mixed signals and situational pressures run
amok than anything unusually corrupt about the dispositions of the
managers involved. As Warren Buffett said in 1997, well before the
scandals ever emerged, the inclination to engage in deceptive
earnings management had made it "very tough to cleanse the
system ... because you don't have good guys and bad guys
anymore."'
If that is so, then the right reaction is probably not moral outrage
and the right regulatory response is not necessarily the broad-brush
criminalization threatened by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.' This
a decline in reporting norms, see Gene D'Avolio et al., Technology, Information Production
and Market Efficiency (Sept. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at httpl/post.
economics.harvard.edu/hier/2001papers/2002ist.html. On the link between technological
change and disclosure policy, see Donald C. Langevoort, Toward More Effective Risk
Disclosure for Technology-Enhanced Investing, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 753 (1997).
4. Lawrence A. Cunningham, ed., Conversations from the Warren Buffett Symposium, 19
CARDOZO L. REv. 719, 799 (1997).
5. Sarbanes-Oxley does much more than criminalize. I do not mean to be critical of the
Act's overall thrust, especially as it addresses conflict of interest problems in corporate
governance, accounting, investment banking, and the provision of legal services. See, e.g.,
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It
20041
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
is not to trivialize or to excuse financial misreporting: it causes
serious harm and requires a potent remedy. And in some of the
cases-Enron, for example-the misconduct went way out of
bounds. The point is simply that choosing the right forum for
adjudication and remedy requires a more nuanced analysis of what
happened and why, not the lumping of all the scandals together into
an undifferentiated mass. That story begins with the state of
technology and innovation in the 1990s.
I. TECHNOLOGY'S FIRST DIMENSION: THE ISSUERS THEMSELVES
Enron, we know, was an energy business that transformed itself
into an investment bank making markets in energy trading,
broadband, and many other synthetic assets-an extraordinarily
sophisticated, technology-based task.' WorldCom was one of the
major players in telecommunications, and Global Crossing was an
innovator in the trans-oceanic communications business. Adelphia,
Xerox, AOL-Time Warner and so many others fit the same mold.
What could a firm's product line have to do with either the motive
or opportunity to manage earnings or other financial metrics? I
shall explore some of the connections in more detail below, including
the simple fact that retail investors became fascinated with stocks
that had a technology-based story.7 At a higher level of generality,
however, an important common thread was the perception that cut-
throat competition was necessary to grow. There was a strong sense
during the 1990s that the Internet and related technological
changes provided a short window of opportunity for firms to achieve
the scale necessary to be a winner (or survivor) in newly redefined
product lines. Many competitors would not survive if they did not
fight for growth. Those that succeeded would be lavishly rewarded
in something resembling a winner-take-all tournament. "Eat or be
eaten" was a common incantation. As a result, both hope and fear-
Just Might Work), 35 CoNN. L. REV. 915 (2003). For a more critical view, see Larry E.
Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002).
6. For a thorough review, see FRANKPARTNOY, INFEIOUSGREED: How DECEITAND RISK
CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS (2003); see also Healy & Palepu, supra note 1.
7. See Eli Ofek & Michael Richardson, DotCom Mania: The Rise and Fall of Internet
Stock Prices, 58 J. FIN. 1113 (2003).
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two of the most profound motivators in human and organizational
psychology'--were strongly at work.
The connection to financial misreporting here is two-fold, and the
duality is important. Growth is financed in the capital markets,
either through infusions of capital (IPOs, borrowings, etc.) or
through stock-for-stock acquisitions of existing or potential competi-
tors. The higher the perceived valuation of the company, the more
it could accelerate its growth through equity-based financing; the
more solid its balance sheet and cash flow, the more it could
leverage itself in the debt market and avoid default on existing
debt.9 More indirectly, reported measures of strong growth could be
of value in other markets, including the attraction of high-quality
employees and the gaining of customers. The latter deserves special
note. In a market where many firms are likely to disappear quickly,
customers naturally seek out the most likely survivors to establish
dependable relationships. Firms that demonstrate strong earnings
and revenue growth are most likely to survive, which can in turn
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The more firms can convince
customers to make long-term commitments, the more they gain
resources enabling them to be around for the long term. Of course,
once the motivation to demonstrate strong revenue and earnings is
seen, the temptation to create illusions of success is equally clear.
The other connection is managerial motivation. Growth in highly
competitive markets is difficult and takes a highly motivated
management team. Conservatism, much less sloth, is deadly.
Beginning in the late 1980s, firms rapidly increased the use of
incentive pay for executives and other key employees as the primary
component of their compensation packages. ° Stock options, in
particular, came to dominate in technology-based industries,
gradually migrating into many other market segments where
8. See generally Lola L. Lopes, Between Hope and Fear: The Psychology of Risk, 20
ADVANCES IN EXPERvMENTALSOC. PSYCHOL. 255 (1987) (exploring the contours of risk and the
study of risky behavior).
9. On the connection between debt covenants and the incentive to manage or misreport
earnings, see Patricia Dechow et al., Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An
Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13 CONTEMP. AccT. RES. 1, 21
(1996); see also Thomas Fields et al., Empirical Research on Accounting Choice, 31 J. ACCT.
& ECON. 255 § 4.2.2 (2001).
10. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design
of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHi. L. REv. 751, 791-92 (2002).
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growth pressures were increasing. Though not well acknowledged
at the time, this trend produced an obvious agency-cost problem
because executives could cash out their stock in the near-term stock
market." We could expect them, therefore, to focus obsessively on
the. immediate stock price-and perhaps manipulate it if they
could-with less attention to the long term.
In the aftermath of Enron and the like, this second story has
come to dominate, and many of the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms operate
on the premise that these scandals simply demonstrated the
severity of the agency-cost problem. The popular account was about
executive selfishness and greed to the detriment of the firm's
shareholders. My suspicion, however, is that while both accounts
are important, it is actually the first that takes precedence.' 2 An
important force that was driving the managers in Enron and
WorldCom to create illusions of growth was that any disclosure of
weaknesses or problems (shortfalls in customer orders, increases in
costs or liabilities, etc.) would have translated into an advantage for
the firms' competitors and a potentially lethal loss of competitive
edge in the product or capital marketplace.
That these illusions also directly increased the managers' own
wealth is far from trivial-basic psychology teaches that executive
inference is heavily self-serving' 3-but hard to disentangle from the
connection to financial misreporting. The fact that so many of the
executives in these scandals sold only portions of their portfolios
11. See id.; see also Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures to
Maximize Performance-Based Remuneration: A Case of Misaligned Incentives?, 35 WAKE
FoREST L. REV. 83, 86-88 (2000).
12. See Baruch Lev, Corporate Earnings: Facts and Fiction, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 27, 36
(2003):
While the image of managers who feather their own nests attracts an
understandably large share of attention ... my sense is that the more common
reason for earnings manipulation is that managers, forever the optimists, are
trying to 'weather out the storm"--that is, to continue operations with adequate
funding and customer/supplier support until better times come.
On the role of skewed disclosure to non-investor constituencies as a motivation to mislead,
see Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101, 115-
18 (1997).
13. See, e.g., George Loewenstein, Behavioral Decision Theory and Business Ethics:
Skewed Trade-offs Between Self and Other, in CODES OF CONDUCT. BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH
NmO BuSINES ETmCS 214, 221 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
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before the collapse of their stock prices strongly suggests that the
frauds that occurred were not primarily about personal wealth
maximization. Executives were betting that the illusions could
indeed become self-fulfilling-that the immediate competitive gains
from shading the truth would more than compensate for any harms
flowing from a loss of credibility were the truth eventually to be
discovered. Many of these bets were predictably overly optimistic. 4
Most, however, were probably made with the sense that, at the time,
they were aggressively consistent with the firm's interests.
II. TECHNOLOGY'S SECOND DIMENSION: THE RISE OF THE
UNSTABLE RETAIL INVESTOR
The second place where technology played an important causal
role in the financial scandals was in the mechanisms of investment.
The unfixing of brokerage commission rates in the 1970s led to the
rise of the discount broker, who cut commission fees by reducing
the broker's role in the provision of customized investment advice.
The broker's self-interest, however, was still in active trading by
the customer, hence the search was on for low-cost ways of
prompting customer demand. By the 1990s, the Internet offered the
ideal mechanism, permitting inexpensive, rapid execution without
any costly broker involvement yet providing a rich display of
investment-related information that-if portrayed in the right
way-could entice the investor to trade with greater and greater
frequency.'5 Soon on-line trading became the norm for the active
retail investor, growing with exceptional speed. By the first quarter
of 2000, some twenty percent of all trading was being generated by
on-line accounts. 16
14. See, e.g., Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An
Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REv. 306, 314-15 (1999) (reporting an empirical study
showing that much of the confidence of market entrance is misplaced); Langevoort, supra note
12, at 139-41.
15. See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, The Internet and the Investor, 15 J. ECON.
PERSP. 41, 41-42 (2001); see also SEC Special Study: On-line Brokerages: Keeping Apace of
Cyberspace, [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 86,222 (Nov. 22, 1999)
(discussing the brokerage industry of the future and its implications on regulations). For a
prescient analysis, see Lynn A. Stout, Technology, Transactions Costs, and Investor Welfare:
Is a Motley Fool Born Every Minute, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 791 (1997).
16. See D'Avolio et al., supra note 3, at 6.
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This phenomenon was fed not only by the on-line brokerage firms
such as E-trade but by the financial media as well. Financial
websites delivered greater streams of data and cable television
followed suit. A number of cable networks devoted their program-
ming during trading hours completely to market and issuer
information, making celebrities of executives, analysts, and their
own reporters. The connection between cable coverage and on-line
trading is clear. A study by Busse and Green of a popular show on
CNBC showed that stocks mentioned favorably, on average, had a
forty-one basis point positive abnormal return in the first minute of
an interview that was favorable to the issuer and sixty-two basis
points within fifteen minutes.17 Retail investors were competing
with market professionals to gain an edge via rapid-fire trading.
The growing influence of retail investors in daily trading-
especially those focused on the technology sector'-suggests that
prices may have become more volatile and noisy as a result.19
Putting aside for a moment the wisdom of professional traders,
recent studies of retail investor behavior demonstrate marked
tendencies to trade on "pseudo-news" rather than careful fundamen-
tal analysis," resulting in a tendency toward trend-chasing and
overreaction to highly salient bits of information. The deepest study
of actual on-line trading in accounts at a large discount brokerage
firm during the 1990s showed that on-line traders demonstrated
considerable overconfidence, trading at higher and higher velocity
in response to positive market news with little regard for the fact
that even their discounted brokerage fees were eating up their
returns.2' At times the evidence is comical. During the 1990s, MCI
17. Jeffrey A. Busse & T. Clifton Green, Market Efficiency in Real Time, 65 J. FIN. ECON.
415, 421 (2002). To be sure, this effect dissipated quickly, and Busse and Green do not put it
forth as evidence of inefficiency. The point is simply to illustrate the potential for influencing
prices on a more sustained basis.
18. See Ofek & Richardson, supra note 7.
19. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and
the Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225, 272-73 (2001).
20. See David Hirshleifer, Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing, 56 J. FIN. 1533, 1543
(2001). I reviewed this literature from a legal viewpoint in Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the
Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw.
U. L. REv. 135 (2002).
21. See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The
Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773,799-800 (2000).
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(coincidentally, the company that became WorldCom) was a fast-
growing company. Its ticker symbol was MCIC; a small closed-end
investment company, Massmutual Corporate Investors, had claimed
the symbol MCI. With regularity, the release of positive news by the
big MCI would lead to a statistically significant run-up in the price
of Massmutual shares simply because investors were mistakenly
buying its stock because of the confusing ticker symbols.22
It appears that increasing retail investor involvement in the daily
trading markets contributed to a nontrivial reduction in market
efficiency, at least in the technology sector.23 The increasing
influence of the so-called noise traders made it more likely that
markets would be hyper-sensitive to some kinds of information that
are, in the proper context, relatively insignificant, while being
insensitive to other kinds of information that may be more relevant
to the company's long-term prospects. Consequently, on-line trading
began to flourish roughly at the same time that companies became
so fearful of falling short of analyst earnings estimates even by a
penny.24
If this correlation between investor overreaction and earnings
management is accurate, the first two technology stories connect.
As I have shown, issuers were under increasing pressure to create
favorable impressions in the capital markets and avoid negative
surprises. Noise trading made the markets more easily manipula-
ble, as issuers learned what kinds of disclosures would excite
investors-and gain favorable attention on outlets like CNBC-and
what had to be avoided. The disclosure and financial reporting
script was rewritten for a more emotional, less sophisticated
audience. This was also the time, it turns out, when some sell-side
22. See Michael S. Rashes, Massively Confused Investors Making Conspicuously Ignorant
Choices (MCI-MCIC), 56 J. FIN. 1911, 1912-13 (2001).
23. See Ofek & Richardson, supra note 7.
24. The evidence here is admittedly circumstantial. One study has shown that firms with
relatively greater institutional ownership are more likely to work hard to meet or exceed
expectations-i.e., engage in careful earnings management. See Dawn A. Matsumoto,
Management's Incentives to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises, 77 ACCT. REV. 483,489 (2002).
That would suggest that earnings management is targeted at active institutional traders;
however, it is at least plausible that the institutional traders are engaging in momentum
strategies premised on predictions of overreaction by retail investors.
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investment analysts were allegedly being enlisted to assist issuers
in their reporting "spin" instead of offering unbiased advice.2 5
In sum, both the motive and the opportunity to create sustained
illusions in the markets increased during the 1990s. This, in turn,
had an effect on the psyches of corporate executives.26 The financial
reporting process commands respect when disclosure of material
information leads to a measured, rational response. When pseudo-
news excites or depresses, and much important detail and perspec-
tive seems simply to be ignored, managers can readily become
cynical about disclosure and reporting, seeing it as little more than
a game. This conception of disclosure can easily lead them to
trivialize the substance of mandatory disclosure, resulting in
managers giving themselves implicit permission to skew the facts
without substantial guilt, so long as they think that the firm and its
long-term shareholders benefit from the spin. It is easy to think that
an investment marketplace that acts with more exuberance than
prudence neither wants nor deserves disclosure in strict conformity
to the rules. That rationalization contributed mightily to the
21devolution of reporting norms.
25. See, e.g., Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of
Underwriter Analyst Recommendations, 12 REV. FIN. STuD. 653, 657-60 (1999). This
development, of course, became the basis for major reform efforts, as evidenced in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its aggressive enforcement led by New York Attorney General Elliot
Spitzer. For a legal analysis, see Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as
Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOwA L. REV. 1035 (2003).
26. See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap" in Investor Protection:
The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. Rsv. 1139, 1146-49 (2003).
27. Until recently, at least, the foregoing discussion would quickly be met by the claim
that noise traders cannot have a sustained impact on market prices because the smart money
would arbitrage away the distance between the price and fundamental value. There is no
doubt that arbitrage can and does work under some circumstances, but there is a growing
acceptance that it does so very imperfectly. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The
Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 47-49 (1997). Constraint on short-selling is one main
reason. The other is that while there can be consensus among sophisticated traders that a
price is too high or too low, the question of when the noise will dissipate is fraught with
uncertainty. That risk leads to underinvestment in corrective trading.
Enron has provided a good illustration, because many professionally advised pension funds
and mutual funds were significant losers, buying Enron stock very late in the process (after
warning signs were becoming more vivid) and holding too long. The explanations are varied,
but many scholars focus on the herd-like behavior of portfolio managers--behavior that is a
rational temptation given compensation arrangements in this field. See, e.g., Paul A. Gompers
& Andrew Metrick, Institutional Investors and Equity Prices, 116 Q.J. ECON. 229,257 (2001);
Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices, 54 J. FIN. 581,583-86
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III. TECHNOLOGY'S THIRD DIMENSION: BREAKING THE TRADITIONAL
BOUNDARIES OF THE FIRM
A. Derivatives and Synthetics
The fall of Enron, in particular, has focused much attention on
the extensive use of structured finance techniques and derivatives
financing in the structure of the modem corporation. Structured
finance is the less technology-driven development of the two, though
modern information technology is essential to it in important
respects. Assets and liabilities can be transferred to a related entity
for financing purposes such that investors need only be concerned
with the financial condition of that entity, presumably leading to a
more favorable evaluation. The accounting treatment--on which
Enron slipped-permits the transferred assets and liabilities to be
separated from the originating company's balance sheet and
income statement.2" Derivatives are more clearly a product of
technological innovation: highly complex, customized contractual
arrangements for allocating the risk of almost anything between
the counterparties. In Enron, the potency came from their combina-
tion.29 The special purpose entities entered into extraordinarily
complicated risk allocation contracts with Enron that were pegged
to a variety of measures, including Enron's own stock price.
From a financial reporting standpoint, several points deserve
attention. First, the fact that each derivative is customized makes
(1999). Portfolio managers are much more concerned with not lagging behind their peers than
with outperforming them, because the penalty/reward structure is asymmetric. If Enron has
been doing well lately, the herd will be inclined to stay with the momentum and feed
additional money into it, thereby accelerating the momentum in the short run. In the face of
this phenomenon, managers are reluctant to defect from the group by selling for fear that the
momentum will continue and they will be left behind. The effect is to feed the influence of the
noise traders rather than to counteract it.
28. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in
Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1309-11 (2002). For a review of the accounting
treatment, see Anthony H. Catanach, Jr. & Shelley Rhoades-Catanach, Enro" A Financial
Reporting Failure?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1057 (2003).
29. Frank Partnoy suggests that the Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) by themselves would
have been harmless without the derivatives element. See PARTNOY, supra note 6, at 373-92,
397-99; Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of "May," 48 VILL.
L. REv. 1245, 1249-62 (2003).
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valuation difficult individually and impossible in the aggregate. The
contingencies written into the arrangements are mind-numbingly
intricate. Depending on how events play out, there are endless
possible end-states. And when these instruments are bundled into
.the firm's portfolio, they interact in countless possible ways. This
uncertainty tempts financial executives who would prefer to hide
the level of risk assumed by the firm, because even a sophisticated,
dedicated investment analyst is unlikely to try to untangle the
complexity.3' A firm, like Enron, that aggressively wants to leverage
its capital structure can do so opaquely. In an efficient market the
mystery itself would be penalized to reflect the outside world's risk
of uncertainty.3 ' Yet in the 1990s, at least, the market did not react
that way.
Derivatives also blur-perhaps even make meaningless-the line
between debt and equity. They are not equity securities because
they involve obligations to pay. The complex set of contingencies
typically built into them, however, permits the assumption of risk
well beyond that ordinarily identified with debt. They fit nowhere
particularly well, either on the balance sheet or the income state-
ment. Users of the financial statements who rely too heavily on
simple metrics like solvency or earnings per share are endangered.
In terms of the dimension described earlier, derivatives are part
of the opportunity story-a firm wanting to create an illusion to gain
access to capital or other resources can obscure its liabilities and
risks far more easily by using them extensively. (Of course, so can
executives whose motives are more selfish.) Likewise, the more
insiders feel the need to gamble their way out of difficulty, the more
they can do so without triggering the traditional financial metrics
that signal trouble when more conventional techniques are used.
30. See Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter An Explanation for
"Dirty Pooling" and Some Other Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141,184-88
(1997).
31. This is a classic "lemons" problem, as described by George Akerlof. See George A.
Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J.
ECON. 488 (1970).
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B. Business-to-Business Relationships
The derivatives story behind Enron and some of the other
financial scandals is well-known. Many of the scandals, howe ver,
have less to do with synthetic financial instruments and more to do
with conventional accounting questions like revenue recognition 32
and capitalization versus expensing. Here, the technology link is
more subtle but quite profound.
There has been a so-called "revolution" in business-to-business
relationships at both ends of the production process.' The relation-
ship between firms and their suppliers has become much closer than
the old-style market sale transaction. "Just in time" delivery
systems emphasize supplier investment in firm-specific knowledge
and close communication so that fluctuations in demand can be
handled seamlessly. As many have noted, this revolution blurs the
traditional boundaries of the firm.3 ' The "make or buy" decision that
has long characterized the firm means less when external suppliers
form supple long-term relationships with the company. These long-
term relationships represent a decision somewhere in between
"make" or "buy." So, too, do customer relationships, which simply
reflect this same dynamic a few steps down the line.
The result is that many of the historic conventions of financial
reporting have rapidly become much more artificial.35 Here,
32. For a good overview of revenue recognition fraud issues, see Manning Gilbert Warren
III, Revenue Recognition and Corporate Counsel, 56 SMU L. REV. 885, 909-22 (2003).
33. See, e.g., Robert E. Litan & Alice M. Rivlin, The Economy and the Internet: What Lies
Ahead?, in THE ECONOMIC PAYOFF FROM THE INTERNET REVOLUTION 12-15 (Robert E. Litan
& Alice M. Rivlin eds., 2001).
34. See, e.g., Andrew McAfee, Manufacturing: Lowering Boundaries, Improving
Productivity, in THE ECONOMIC PAYOFF FROM THE INTERNET REVOLUTION 29,39-41,48-50,55
(Robert E. Litan & Alice M. Rivlin eds., 2001); Linda V. Ruchala, Managing and Controlling
Specialized Assets, MGMr. ACCT., Oct. 1997, at 20, 26 (discussing how supplier-customer
agreements, among other things, have "blurred the lines between organizations").
35. In addition to this trend, technology has an impact in terms of the relative value of
intangible (i.e., intellectual) property as compared to other assets. Accounting's historic
reluctance to allow firms to claim the full value of these intangibles effectively hides them
from view and implicitly penalizes firms whose value resides in the intangibles vis-k-vis those
whose assets are more tangible. See MARGARET M. BLAIR & STEVEN M.H. WALLMAN, UNSEEN
WEALTH: REPORT OF THE BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON INTANGIBLES 7-10,23-31 (2001); ROBERT
G. ECCLES T AL., THE VALUE REPORTING REVOLUTION: MOVING BEYOND THE EARNINGS GAME
221-24 (2001); see also Steven M.H. Wallman, The Future of Accounting and Disclosure in an
Evolving World: The Need for Dramatic Change, 9 ACCT. HORIZONS 81, 84-86 (1995). A feeling
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WorldCom offers an example. The main form of accounting fraud
alleged against WorldCom was the improper capitalization of $3.8
billion in line costs (i.e., what WorldCom was paying for access to
lines built and operated by third parties).3' By all accounts,
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) require expensing
these costs, which would reduce earnings. WorldCom improperly
capitalized them instead and thus showed higher earnings.37
While the rules may be clear enough, the economic reality is far
less so. WorldCom officials appeared to justify their misreporting on
grounds that these particular line costs would generate predictable
revenue over a definable period, just like a capital investment. If so,
then expensing would also be misleading. Imagine that a company
enters into a long-term contract to purchase line capacity, which
creates a sense of security that enables the other firm to invest in
building or expansion of that capacity. The economics are much the
same as if the firm was building the capacity itself, which would
permit capitalization and thus favorable income statement treat-
ment. By choosing an economically similar route that does not
involve the formalities of internalization, a harsher result ensues.
Now, consider this from the standpoint of the executive making
the "make or buy" decision who believes that, simply from a
business standpoint, the deal with the third party makes better
sense. The technology of business relationships increasingly makes
that kind of partnering feasible without taking on costly new
employees, facilities, and so on. But to return to the first dimension,
assume also that this is a fast-growing firm seeking the maximum
advantage in access to capital, customers, and the like. The
that this penalization was unfair would also contribute to a sense that the prevailing norms
were illegitimate.
36. See Jesse Drucker & Henny Sender, Sony, Wrong Number: Strategy Behind
Accounting Scheme, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, at A9. For a description of the rationalization
process, see First Interim Report of Dick Thornburgh, Bankruptcy Court Examiner at 26-28,
In re WorldCom, Inc. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02-15533 (AJG)) [hereinafter First Interim
Report of Dick Thornburgh], available at http//www.graypanthers.org/wcom-library/
thornburgh-l.pdf.
37. The capitalization occurred at a fairly late stage in the recording process as a result
of high-level intervention to revise the treatment. See First Interim Report of Dick
Thornburgh, supra note 36, at 25-29; see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and
Limits to Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming
2004) (manuscript at app. A), available at http/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid
=444600.
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accounting penalty may be intolerable if it creates a competitive
disadvantage, even if the economic distinctions are minimal.
The executive will feel immense pressure to gain both the
economic and accounting edges. More importantly, if he or -she
manipulates the accounting decision to capitalize even though
GAAP forbids it, there is unlikely to be much guilt. The convention
is purely artificial, penalizing legitimate economic choices without
reason other than to maintain old-fashioned distinctions in the
rules.'
Under these circumstances, some will adhere to the rules and
others will not. Psychologists teach that compliance with the law, at
least when there is a relatively low probability of detection, is
heavily influenced by perceptions of the legitimacy of the rules.39 I
strongly suspect that over the course of the 1990s, as the boundaries
of the firm became less distinct with respect to both suppliers and
customers, executives who had so much to lose from any given
accounting treatment came to disdain the artificiality of the
accounting rules as they applied to these areas. As that disdain
developed into a sense that orthodox accounting was penalizing
good business decisions, accounting's legitimacy was diminished,
and the rate of manipulation and noncompliance rose. High-tech
firms-whose emphasis on intangible assets already puts them at
a disadvantage under prevailing norms of financial reporting °-
were especially likely to chafe under these constraints. And as
noncompliance increased, the pressure grew for competitors to do
the same, lest they put themselves hopelessly behind the more
38. This point was made recently by SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman.
Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman, Financial Reform: Relevance and Reality in Financial
Reporting, Address at the National Association for Business Economics (Sept. 16, 2003), at
http'Jlwww.sec.gov/newsfspeech/spch091603cag.htm.
39. See TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
40. See supra note 35. The treatment of research and development expenditures, which
in many cases require expensing rather than capitalization, is another example of
penalization that many high-tech firms face. See, e.g., Baruch Lev & Theodore Sougiannis,
Penetrating the Book-to-Market Black Box: The R&D Effect, 26 J. Bus. FIN. & ACcT. 419, 435-
42 (1999); Lev, supra note 12, at 30-33. My sense, in part, is that the vehemence with which
many high-tech firms fought to avoid the requirement that executive stock options be
expensed was not simply selfish but also a product of the belief that they were already being
disadvantaged and that expensing options would simply push them further backwards.
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aggressive firms. Conservative accounting had become a loser's
game. Financial reporting norms devolved for this reason, too.
IV. THE FEEDBACK LOOP
A. Testing the Limits
The three important lessons from the foregoing can be summa-
rized:
(1) The incentive to misreport was as much, and maybe more,
a product of competitive fear as it was a product of personal
greed. Managers in fast-changing, technology-based markets
became convinced that earnings aggressive management-and
perhaps some cheating-was a survival tactic. Although there
was, no doubt, much rationalization and self-serving inference
used in developing this tactic, the basic fear was rational.
(2) The stock market provided greater opportunity for
cheating by shifting its focus away from careful fundamental
analysis to indicators of short-term price movement-a "sound
bite" culture. Greater retail participation in daily trading was an
important force in this trend.
(3) Innovation in business strategies made the lines drawn in
the historic norms of financial reporting increasingly artificial
and outdated. Playing conservatively by the accounting rules
were seen as conforming to a regime in which fairness and
utility were questionable as a reflection of economic reality. In
the eyes of many managers, financial reporting had lost its
relevance and legitimacy.
These three factors combined into a feedback loop. Managers were
pressured to push the limits of the prevailing norms. For a long time
no one seriously pushed back. The market responded positively;
indeed, it increased its expectations of performance so that exceed-
ing expectations became that much more difficult, requiring all the
more aggressiveness. 1 The auditing profession was acquiescent, we
41. See William H. Beaver, What We Have Learned from the Recent Corporate Scandals
That We Did Not Already Know, S STAN. J.L. Bus. & FiN. 155, 163 (2002) (emphasizing the
connection between high growth rates and targets and the pressure to engage in earnings or
revenue deception).
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are told, because of conflicts of interest in the generation of non-
audit fees. Such conflicts of interests are no doubt part of the story,
but there is probably more to it. As the accounting norms them-
selves became more complicated and subjective, the ability to
confidently say "no" to a client diminished.42 I suspect that many
accountants were also coming to share managers' views about the
contemporary relevance of accounting principles,3 which also led to
a loss of faith that there were cognizable lines that management
should not be allowed to cross.
Nor did the legal system push back. Through most of the 1990s,
the SEC was quiet about overly aggressive financial reporting,
coming to the subject with too little, too late." The explanation here
is a mix of limited resources and politics.4 Especially during the
height of the bull market in technology stocks, executives from the
high-tech industry held immense political power, securing major
reform of private securities litigation and beating back initiatives
such as mandatory expensing of stock options.' Challenging
conduct that these executives saw as a competitive necessity was
bound to be a costly, and probably losing, battle. Hence, the implicit
regulatory message was one of ambivalence, born of vain hope that
the markets would take note and call the companies to task. SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt's prescient speech in 1998 about accounting
42. See Max H. Bazerman et al., The Impossibility of Auditor Independence, 38 SLOAN
MGMT. REv. 89,93 (1997); Mark W. Nelson & William R. Kinney, Jr., The Effect of Ambiguity
on Loss Contingency Reporting Judgments, 72 ACCT. REV. 257,269-72 (1997); Mark W. Nelson
et al., Evidence from Auditors about Managers' and Auditors' Earnings Management
Decisions, 77 ACcT. REV. 175, 189-98 (Supp. 2002). The opposite problem also occurred. Under
pressure from a variety of sources, some GAAP rules were changed to be more mechanical.
That, too, made it impossible for the auditor to resist if the company was literally in
compliance, even if the economic substance made no sense. For a useful discussion of these
changes, see Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, How the Quest for Efficiency Corroded the
Market, HARV. Bus. REV., July 2003, at 76, 78-80.
43. See ECCLESETAL.,supra note 35, at 103-08.
44. Note that the SEC's view that GAAP compliance is not a complete defense to a fraud
claim resurrected a case, United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), that was largely
forgotten until after the scandals. See note 64 infra. One would be hard pressed to find that
kind of claim aggressively pursued or even threatened by the Commission during the 1990s.
The same is true of many other legal positions taken in response to allegations of firms'
fraudulent conduct.
45. See Langevoort, supra note 26.
46. For a recounting of the politics associated with these issues, see JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 714-41 (3d ed. 2003).
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gimmicks47 was far more of a wake-up call directed to investors than
a signal that a wave of tough enforcement actions was immediately
forthcoming."
* As a result, managers gradually learned from experience that
additional steps in the direction of lower-quality financial reporting
paid off without serious penalty. If neither the auditors nor the
government was taking reporting seriously, why should they? The
feedback loop then became a vicious cycle. The most aggressive
executives pushed harder and harder. Enron was sufficiently proud
of its regulatory arbitrage that it tried to market its creative
accounting services to others. The very fact that it did this so
brazenly shows that executives had little sense at this point that
their conduct was seriously wrongful. In turn, less aggressive
managers conformed. And inevitably some of this aggressiveness
crossed over the line to starker forms of fraud. If no one is pushing
back, why stop, especially when it is so easy to rationalize the
cheating as utilitarian? As the cheating became more pronounced
and business downturns occurred, the slippery slope became steeper
as some managers realized that they had crossed the line and
deliberately took more aggressive steps either to cover up the fraud
or to gamble their way out of it. The important thing to remember,
however, is how many situational forces combined to make the slope
so wet.
47. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt, The "Numbers Game,"
Address at the New York University Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998), at
http:J/www.sec.gov/news/speecharchivesI1998/spch220. txt. To its credit, the SEC's action,
once it began to take the issue seriously, was on the mark, though still not particularly heavy-
handed. A key step was the promulgation of Staff Accounting Bulletin 99, which defined
materiality for reporting purposes in terms of measures likely to influence investors
regardless of quantitative significance. For an application of the materiality standard, see
Ganino v. Citizens Util. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 161-68 (2d Cir. 2000).
48. Congress and the judiciary also contributed by making accounting.based 'fraud on the
market" lawsuits harder to bring. Although a good bit of this effort was in the form of
protection to accounting firms and other "gatekeepers," see John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding
Enron: 'It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1409-10 (2002), courts beth
before and after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act showed a strong willingness to
dismiss cases on the ground that insufficient evidence of scienter was proffered even though
the violation of GAAP was clear. See, e.g., In re K-Tel Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2002);
Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1997); Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478
(9th Cir. 1996).
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B. Evaluating the Harm
That many of the financial reporting scandals were the product
of strong situational forces is no excuse, especially to the extent that
they caused severe harm. The harm, however, is more difficult to
assess than most people think. Popular portrayals often cite the
drop in stock price values from their highs as measures of what
investors lost. That view, of course, is wrong-the inflated valua-
tions were illusions, and investors who were smart or lucky enough
to have sold at or near the highs were simply gaining at some
uninformed buyer's expense. The harm came to those who bought
at inflated prices and held until it was too late. It is also easy to
overestimate the net cost to investors, though surely it was
significant. For every unfortunate buyer there was an innocent
lucky seller, except. to the extent of sales by insiders or others with
inside information. Although that fact is scant comfort to the
particular buyers in question, it suggests that much of the effect of
the fraud was in the form of pocket-shifting. The shareholder group
most severely harmed was the set of undiversified investors-such
as Enron employees with too much invested in that particular
stockP9-who bought and held. Less likely to be harmed were active,
diversified traders.
Indeed, in many ways scandals like Enron were as much frauds
on debtholders as on holders of common stock. Designed in large
part to make the company's credit rating appear more solid than it
really was, and thus to facilitate access to a fluid supply of money,
these schemes were intended to benefit equity holders, albeit with
the infusion of a higher level of risk. Securities fraud also harms
competitor firms-those who would have gotten more business or
better market valuations if fairly compared to their peers, rather
than looking inferior because other firms in the industry are cooking
the books-which, in turn, leads to capital misallocation.' There is
a comparative dimension to this harm, however, because once
aggressive reporting becomes the norm in an industry, the relative
prejudice is lessened. As Judge Posner put it in a related context, in
49. See Jennifer O'Hare, Misleading Employer Communications and the Securities Fraud
Implications of the Employee as Investor, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1217, 1217-18 (2003).
50. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should
Regulate Whom?, 95 MICH. L. Ray. 2498,2540-50 (1997).
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a setting where puffery is the order of the day, the unvarnished
truth becomes misleading.51
Finally, there is the matter of comparative fault. It is hard to
disentangle the portion of an inflated stock price that is tied to the
misreporting from that simply caused by the market's exuberance.
I suspect that many of the fraud cases occurred where the firm in
question hit a streak of good fortune that generated an excess of
investor enthusiasm and a stock price run-up without any serious
misreporting. The situational pressures came from the desire to
avoid negative surprises that would trigger an overreaction on the
downside. In measuring the harm, the question is how much of the
inflation would have occurred regardless of any fraud (i.e., was
simply the product of investor exuberance) and how much was
directly attributable to the misreporting. That question is not easily
answered, either-certainly not simply by looking at the deflation
that occurred once panic set in. 2
V. EFFECTIVE REGULATORY REFORM
A. The Starting Point
The likely efficacy of the regulatory reform stimulated by
Sarbanes-Oxley can be measured against the foregoing. Technologi-
cal innovation is accelerating. There is no reason to believe that the
pressures or the innovations described earlier will change. Thus, we
can expect managers to be operating under those constraints for the
foreseeable future. Market efficiency is more episodic. I am not
willing to predict that the "retailization" of daily trading activity
will be a permanent part of the capital markets; we could just as
well see a return toward institutionalization if retail investors learn
that active trading leads, on average, to inferior returns. History,
however, teaches that investor sentiment, and carelessness, is
cyclical and that there will be future periods of opportunity when
the other pressures result in issuer-generated illusions that too
easily become impounded in market price.
51. Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Where puffing is the
order of the day, literal truth can be profoundly misleading, as senders and recipients of
letters of recommendation well know.").
52. See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 182-86.
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Therefore, regulation has to be designed carefully in light of these
realities and should not reflect a simplistic impression of what
happened to give rise to the scandals. Take, for example, the
increased independence requirements for audit committee members
and board members generally. 3 The prevailing impression that
financial misreporting was about executive greed and the self-
serving desire to facilitate option exercises at the expense of the
company's long-run interests easily justifies the effort to shift more
power to outsiders. Implicitly-and explicitly, perhaps, in the SEC's
recent efforts to allow large shareholders greater voice in nominat-
ing directors54-the idea is to have directors whose interests are
more closely aligned with those of investors. If much of financial
misreporting is competitive rather than selfish, however, we cannot
expect such directors to interfere to any great extent. At best, they
might moderate managerial over-optimism, but even this is not
clear.5" Ironically, the scenario where independent directors are
more likely to check this kind of behavior is where they are less
interested in the returns to investors being generated by the
company and thus more sensitive to their own liability risks.
Directors who attend to nonshareholder constituencies-a group
that plays an underestimated role in corporate governance 6-- could
fall into this category of those more likely to seek legal compliance
even in the face of strong competitive pressures. That is a very
53. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3) (2004); Standards
Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8220, 79 SEC
Docket 3736 (Apr. 16, 2003).
54. See DIv. OF CORP. FIN., SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STAFF REPORT: REVIEW OF THE PROXY
PROCESS REGARDING THE NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF DIRCTRS (July 15,2003), available
at httpJ/www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyreport.pdf.
55. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Laws, Norms, and
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 809
(2001).
56. Governmental authorities, in particular, are an important nonshareholder
constituency for directors who have close connections with them. See generally Anup Agrawal
& Charles R. Knoeber, Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?, 44 J.L. & ECON. 179
(2001) (pointing out that many directors are valuable to the boards on which they serve
primarily for their political connections). This point connects to debates about shareholder
primacy-undue attention to shareholder interests, especially when measured in short-term
results, is not the same thing as the best interests of either the firm itself or society as a
whole. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Directors' Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language
Matters, 38 WAKE FORESTL. REV. 885,891-95 (2003); Bratton, supra note 2, at 1326-28, 1359-
60.
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different direction from most of the reform strategies we observe,
which have bought heavily into the managerial selfishness story.
B. The Philosophy of Financial Reporting
Much of Sarbanes-Oxley's reforms are intended to restore both
integrity and primacy to financial results as reported in accord with
generally accepted accounting principles. The process by which
GAAP is created is made more independent from the industry.57 A
new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board has been created
to oversee and monitor auditor behavior.5" Conflicts of interest
within auditing firms have been lessened. 9 The hope is that
accounting rules will be less management-oriented and more
inclined toward investor protection. In turn, issuers are barred from
reporting financial results outside of GAAP without engaging in a
cumbersome process of disclaimer and reconciliation.' °
Whether this will work is unclear. If I am right about the
pressures on the reporting process just described, technology-driven
innovations are sure to overwhelm a system that is based on rules
rather than principles. 61 The more concrete the tests,6 2 the more
effort will be devoted to finding sophisticated mechanisms to run
ahead of them. It is doubtful that any regulatory body has the
capacity-in terms of resources or expertise-to keep pace with this
sort of innovation. Moreover, the accounting profession is still
biased in the direction of rules that are complex and manipulable,
because that increases the need for and value of their expertise and
57. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 108-109, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7218-7219 (2004).
58. .15 U.S.C. §§ 7211-7217 (2004).
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1, 7231(2004).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 7261(b) (2004); Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 68
Fed. Reg. 4820, 4820-30 (Jan. 30, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 244.100-244.102); see
also David Clarke et al., The SEC's New Disclosure Requirements for Non-GAAP Financial
Information, INSIGHTS, Apr. 2003, at 2.
61. In fact, Sarbanes-Oxley pushes the SEC and the FASB in the direction of principles
rather than rules, presumably for this reason. See 15 U.S.C. § 7218(d) (2004); see also
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, PROPOSAL FORA PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH TO
U.S. STANDARD SETTING, No. 1125-001 (Oct. 21, 2002), available at httpJ/www.fasb.org/
proposals/principles-based-approach.pdf.
62. See Benjamin S. Neuhausen & Reva B. Steinberg, New Consolidation Rules for
VIEs--Formerly Known as SPEs, INSIGHTS, Apr. 2003, at 19, 20 (discussing the 3% equity
requirement for SPEs, which has been revised to 10%).
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generates substantial returns in areas such as tax advisory services,
which are expressly permitted under Sarbanes-Oxley.
As a result, reliance on GAAP is necessary but not sufficient.
Notably, senior executives will have to certify that the companyis
financial reports are not only compliant but "fairly present ... the
financial condition and results of operations of the issuer."' We are
told that this certification requirement will be a centerpiece of
securities law enforcement, both civil and criminal. More generally,
the SEC has also brought back to life an old accounting case, United
States v. Simon, which held that GAAP compliance is not a defense
to accounting fraud; reports can apparently be both compliant and
false and misleading." The SEC has also reinterpreted the Manage-
ment Discussion and Analysis requirement to be the primary bridge
between reported results and economic reality so that issuers risk
being in violation if they conceal whatever is creating the
difference."5
Lurking herein is a problem to which lawyers have paid too little
attention: what, precisely, is the right baseline for financial
reporting? This is not just another way of asking the important
question of whether the accounting rules should be tilted toward
principles rather than rules,' wherein we have to decide how much
subjective discretion should be afforded those responsible for
preparing or auditing the financial statements. In light of technolog-
ical innovation, I think principles are plainly preferable to rules,
even if this increases the resources that must be devoted to ex post
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1241(aX3) (2004); 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004).
64. 425 F.2d 796,805-06,808-09 (2d Cir. 1969). For a critique of broad readings of Simon,
see Christian J. Mixter, United States v. Simon and the New Certification Provisions, 76 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 699, 703-05, 708-13 (2002). Read carefully, it is not clear that Simon is
necessarily about the issue cited-though dicta in the case certainly can be so read. My
explanation of the case-which involved nondisclosure of certain insider transactions-is that
the accountants aided and abetted the insiders' fraud by certifying the financials as GAAP
compliant when apparently they were aware of the self-dealing scheme.
65. Commission Statement About Managements Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8056, 76 SEC Docket 2220
(Jan. 25,2002).
66. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STUDY PURSUANT TO SECTION 108(D) OF THE SARBANES-
OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON THE ADOPTION BY THE UNITED STATES FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM
OF A PRINCIPLES-BAsED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM (July 26, 2003), at http'/www.sec.gov/news/
studies/principlesbasedstand.htm.
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enforcement.67 Even in a principles-based world, however, the
question is: what principles?
Take, for example, one of the fundamental principles on which
accounting has long been based: conservatism.' Caution should rule
in the face of uncertainty-hence, the bias is usually to overstate
costs (or losses) and understate income (or gains). Many more
specific accounting rules are bright-line efforts to impose this same
bias on financial results. Should conservatism be a guiding principle
in a post-Enron world?
While many people instinctively say "of course"-especially with
the recent scandals in mind-remember that conservatism nearly
assures reporting inaccuracy. Imagine, for example, the CEO asked
to certify that financials that have been prepared conservatively
"fairly present" the financial condition and results of operations of
the firm. If, by fairly present, we mean "reflect economic reality,"
then they almost surely do not-because they are probably too
conservative. Indeed, if the story we told earlier is right, there are
likely numerous places where either conservatism or some cognate
accounting rule or principle results in an artificial representation of
the firm's condition that is significantly distinct from economic
reality.69 And that is with faithful, indeed slavish, adherence to
GAAP.
This is hardly a novel insight. For years now the accounting
profession has been debating the role of "fair value" accounting in
which the objective of all prevailing rules and principles is to
67. As Professor Bratton has pointed out, a principles-based regime depends on a strong
enforcer, given management's temptations to construe ambiguous, subjective principles in its
favor. If the accounting profession is not sufficiently reformed, then only aggressive
enforcement will do. See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules
versus Principles versus Rents, 48 ViLL. L. REv. 1023 (2003) (arguing that tough enforcement
is necessary if Sarbanes-Oxley is to have its intended effect). On the tendency of accountants
to see ambiguous rules in self-serving terms, see Max H. Bazerman et al., Why Good
Accountants Do Bad Audits, HARv. Bus. REV., Nov. 2002, at 97, 98-99.
68. See Sudipta Basu, The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of
Earnings, 24 J. ACcT. & ECON. 3, 7-10 (1997); Ross L. Watts, Conservatism in Accounting -
Part I: Explanations and Implications, 1-3 (The Bedley Pol'y Research Ctr.,Working Paper No.
FR 03-16, 2003), at http-//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=414522.
69. For a good discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of GAAP as a generator
of "quality" earnings, see Stephen H. Penman, The Quality of Financial Statements:
Perspectives from the Recent Stock Market Bubble, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 77 (Supp. 2003).
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present the performance of the firm in a fair and unbiased fashion.7 °
Best estimates of current valuations ("mark to market")7' substitute
for historic cost and other artificial measures. The argument for fair
value, of course, is that the conservatism bias in accounting
effectively limits managers' ability to portray accurately the firm's
financial condition, which is not necessarily in the shareholders'
best interests. After all, the securities laws are built on investors'
need for accurate information. Any reporting rule, such as account-
ing standards that deal with expensing versus capitalization, that
fails to capture economic reality with a high enough level of
sensitivity risks communicating misleading information to inves-
tors, distorting rather than aiding inter-firm comparisons. This risk
is one reason why accounting scholars often point out that earnings
management creates potential benefits for investors as well as
imposing obvious costs.72
We saw that frustration with the artificial norms of reporting
may have motivated the inclination to test limits and become
cynical about the relevance of GAAP reporting, especially in the
high-tech sector.73 Some of those who began to manage earnings and
other financial results were fair value revolutionaries, engaging in
acts of GAAP disobedience after convincing themselves that their
reports were a fairer representation of the information to which
investors should be paying attention. A number of investigations-
including WorldCom7 and recently, Freddie Mac7 8-have noted that
management responsible for the violations justified their violations
on precisely these grounds.
70. See Stanley Siegel, The Coming Revolution in Accounting: The Emergence of Fair
Value as the Fundamental Principle of GAAP, 42 WAYNE L. REv. 1839, 1848 (1996).
71. Id.
72. The reasons why can be quite complex, and the literature is extensive. See, e.g., Anil
Arya et al., Earnings Management and the Revelation Principle, 3 REv. AccT. STuD. 7 (1998);
Patricia M. Dechow & Douglas J. Skinner, Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of
Accounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators, 14 ACCT. HORIZONS 235,242-47 (2000).
73. A survey of executives has demonstrated that while most believe their companies to
be undervalued in the market, the perception is strongest among high-tech managers. See
EccLEs ET AL., supra note 35, at 48.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
75. See Patrick Barta et al., Behind Freddie Mac's Troubles: A Strategy to Take on More
Risk, WAL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2003, at Al, A12 ("Some Freddie Mac officials who were involved
in the matter privately say they believed the maneuvers actually gave a truer picture of the
business.... The Baker Botts report confirmed this motivation.").
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The conservatism bias, however, has compelling virtues that
;make it hard to reject. It counters managers' natural bias toward
optimism-thus offering a more credible anchor from which future
earnings can be estimatedV6 -and constrains managerial opportun-
ism." When there is no reliable market, mark-to-market accounting
invites highly skewed estimates, as happened in Enron. Knowing
that assets are real and that movements of funds and property are
properly recorded, even if in accord with artificial rules, is a good
way of keeping managers honest in their stewardship of the
company. Moreover, financial statements play multiple roles. From
the standpoint of a creditor of the firm, conservatism and artificial
rules make ample sense: because there is only downside risk and no
upside participation, conservatism operates as a useful buffer in
conveying warnings about potential solvency problems. That
accounting principles were born at a time when bank lending and
other forms of debt financing dominated corporate financial activity
plausibly explains the strength of the bias.
The equity holder with a relatively short-term investment
horizon-interested in the upside as well as the downside-is in a
more ambiguous position, however, because there is a clear trade-off
between accuracy and verifiability.78 My suspicion is that we have
another piece of the story here. The 1980s and 1990s brought the
flourishing of an equity culture and the significant acceleraton of
portfolio turnover by both institutional and retail investors.
Managers, too, took on this perspective as their compensation
packages became more heavily equity-based and liquidity-oriented.
With an equity bias, accounting discipline was viewed as especially
rigid and confining. In turn, this rigidity exacerbated broader
concerns. Another strong complaint against GAAP is that it
penalizes "knowledge"-based firms by excluding measures of
intellectual and human capital, wherein real comparative advan-
tages lie. Conventionally computed earnings are also misleading for
76. See, e.g., Penman, supra note 69, at 81-93.
77. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE
L.J. 439, 453 & n.53 (2003); Watts, supra note 68, at 3-4.
78. Investors with a very short-term horizon who trade on volatility may well prefer
aggressive accounting to the extent that they believe they can game the system. See Bratton,
supra note 77, at 462.
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that reason.79 We miss something if we forget that the era of
accounting scandals occurred at a time when so many people
thought that GAAP was in many ways archaic. They were-and still
are-probably right.
My point here is not to take a position on the relative merits of
conservatism and the various approaches to fair-value accounting.
Instead, I am simply offering context. Much of Sarbanes-Oxley-not
to mention media attention to the scandals-operates as if GAAP is
a form of religious orthodoxy from which departures can properly be
labeled heresy, making earnings management patently sinful. The
truth is far murkier, however. As a leading accounting scholar,
Baruch Lev, has observed, "[tihe extent to which GAAP fulfills its
mission-the dissemination of quality financial information, and
earnings in particular, to facilitate investors' valuations and the
monitoring of management-has frequently been challenged, but
never more hotly than in the last couple of years.' s°
So long as the underlying philosophy of financial reporting is
doubted, a strong norm of compliance is unlikely to emerge.
Moreover, in light of these doubts, even material, intentional
accounting violations are likely to run along a lengthy continuum of
wrongfulness."1 From the standpoint of investors, at least, a
violation that takes the report farther away from the underlying
economics is far more serious than one that takes it closer-and
both kinds of cases are likely to arise with some frequency.
Most importantly, what this means is that over-deterrence can
have significant costs. Imagine, for example, that the upshot of the
certification requirement for senior executives is to make them
virtual guarantors of GAAP compliance, at the risk of criminal
prosecution for defection. Assume further that this requirement
works as intended and that executives obsess on compliance. In a
regime where conservatism is the dominant philosophy, there is
likely to be an excess of caution, so that reports move further away
79. See, e.g., Thomas A. Stewart, Accounting Gets Radical, FORTUNE, Apr. 16, 2001, at
184-86; see also supra note 35.
80. Lev, supra note 12, at 32.
81. For a provocative claim about why some degree of earnings management is a distinct
social good, see Anil Arya et al., Are Unmanaged Earnings Always Better for Shareholders?,
17 ACcT. HORIZONS 111 (Supp. 2003).
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from economic reality. Because it is too dangerous to push against
.the norms, the value of the underlying information is reduced.
! I am not necessarily predicting this result because the technology-
driven pressures toward "competitive" financial reporting are so
strong.s2 What I am suggesting instead is that many executives are
likely to be caught in the middle of these forces, making the cases
that arise as a result very hard. Many of the recent reforms move
the rock and the hard place closer together. The rule that makes
non-GAAP disclosures far more difficult is an example, 3 because it
chills the issuer's use of one of the methods of communicating a
different story about economic reality. Regulation FD (Fair
Disclosure)-the ban on private communications of material
nonpublic information'-however well-justified on other grounds,
closes another avenue to telling the non-GAAP story.
No system of enforcement will achieve the right balance if it
ignores the ambiguity and debate surrounding the threshold
question of what constitutes a "good" financial report in the first
place. Passing judgment on often ambiguous conduct and its net of
social benefits and harms is an extraordinarily difficult task-not
the easy, Sentencing Guidelines-like formula that we have been led
to think it is. Hence, we should turn to the process of enforcement
and adjudication to see if it is up to the task of disentangling the
good guys from the bad in settings where the distinctions involve so
many different shades of gray.
VI. A FRESH LOOK AT THE ENFORCEMENT AND REMEDIES
If the foregoing is right, then post-Sarbanes-Oxley securities
regulation has to accept the permanence of innovation and respond
82. Nor would such a regime be politically stable. Cf John C. Coates IV, Private vs.
Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political Cost IBenefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT'L L.
531, 561-64 (2001) (advocating the use of a model that takes into account the ability of
executives to "capture" government enforcement mechanisms in the disclosure area). Strong
deterrence is expensive and difficult, making it likely that prosecutions would be fairly
random and episodic. The fear of unfairly being singled out for criminal-like punishment
would likely trigger a political backlash from managers-perhaps justifiably-that would
quietly seek to disable the enforcement system.
83. See supra note 60.
84. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7881, 73
SEC Docket 3 (Aug. 24, 2000).
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accordingly. So long as there remains a disconnection between
GAAP and economic reality, there will be intense pressures on the
system and a large amount of managerial conduct that will test the
limits of the rules. Accepting arguendo that this gap cannot be
eliminated without introducing so much subjectivity that the system
loses its grounding (and becomes far less useful for creditor
protection or for supervising management's stewardship over
assets), the best solution is care and moderation in its application.
Securities regulation, then, has to be flexibly responsive to
technological change. This approach requires an enforcement
system capable of responding quickly to police line-challenging
conduct and an adjudicatory system capable of evaluating the
nature of any misconduct and of applying a remedy. On the
assumption that proportionality is in the long-term interest of
investors, the question becomes what kind of adjudicatory system
best delivers proportionate results. Again, the task of the adjudica-
tor is to untangle the complicated reporting mess and determine
what the motivations were, how bad the misconduct was in context,
and what the right remedy is in light of the factual findings. That
task is extremely hard, and it is doubtful that the federal courts
have the patience and business expertise to make these judgments
with consistent accuracy. Indeed, business expertise is lacking in
the judicial system, with the exception of the Delaware judiciary,
which uniquely has both the incentives and opportunity to learn
from experience and become skilled at these tasks.
This reality suggests to me that the federal securities
adjudicatory process should be made, as much as possible, an
administrative rather than judicial process. Use of administrative
law courts is the norm in banking and other financial services
regulation and in the SEC's supervision of securities professionals.8,5
Administrative proceedings in those areas can be used to fine,
censure, and bar subjects from continued involvement in the
industry-a powerful set of penalties.
Securities regulation has not, however, internalized the
adjudicatory process with respect to public company wrongdoing.
That task was left to the judicial process. To be sure, there have
85. See JAMEs D. Cox ET AL., SECURmIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIAs 863-65 (3d
ed. 2001).
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long been administrative remedies that force issuers to correct their
filings, and in 1990, Congress added cease-and-desist authority to
the Commission's in-house toolkit.' But this expansion of authority
did not have any significant punitive capacity. In Sarbanes-Oxley,
however, there was a little-noticed change that has begun a revision
here-allowing the SEC to use cease-and-desist proceedings to bar
officers and directors involved in securities misconduct from further
service in that capacity with any public company. 7 The Commission
can now bring a financial misreporting case internally that is
designed not simply to expose the conduct but also to punish the
executives involved. More recently, the SEC has asked Congress to
add to this authority the ability to impose fines on the executives
and the companies.s' Were the remedial package complete, 9 the
administrative proceeding could be the mechanism of choice for the
adjudication of financial misreporting cases, creating the possibility
that the administrative law judges could over time gain the
expertise in this area comparable to the Delaware chancery.
If administrative law judges were indeed given the opportunity to
develop such an expertise, the change in corporate and securities
law might be profound. Internalizing corporate misreporting and
fraud cases would permit administrative law judges and the SEC
not only to find the facts but also to develop law, subject to (presum-
ably deferential) appellate oversight by the courts. In other words,
there would be a shift that would permit the Commission to have a
greater voice in evaluating conduct going to the core of financial
disclosure and in a wide range of matters touching on corporate
governance. There is no meaningful line between the spheres of
governance and transparency; they overlap greatly.' Recall that one
of the great innovations in corporate law-the prohibition against
insider trading-was set in motion by the SEC by using its lawmak-
86. Id. at 865-73.
87. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1105, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 78u-3 (2004). On the use of bar
orders prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, see Jayne W. Barnard, When is a Corporate Executive
"Substantially Unfit to Serve"F, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1489 (1992).
88. See Hill Watch, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1122 (July 7, 2003).
89. A truly complete system would include equitable relief beyond the accounting and
disgorgement specifically authorized under Section 21C(e), though it would probably be
acceptable to require judicial assistance in granting this sort of remedy.
90. See Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's Shadow: The SEC's Pursuit
of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449 (2001).
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ing ability in bringing its first case against a stockbroker.91 By
finding open-market insider trading to be a fraud-notwithstanding
a nearly universal assumption to the contrary at that time-the
Commission federalized a form of perceived managerial opportun-
ism. Broadening the scope of the Commission's authority to do the
same to the full range of undisclosed executive misconduct would
expand the Commission's lawmaking ability considerably.
That proposal no doubt frightens many and seems to be an
assault on federalism. Indeed, efforts have been made in the bills
dealing with penalty authority to create a direct right of appeal to
a federal district court from the administrative law judge's imposi-
tion of a penalty, which would substantially reduce the full Commis-
sion's ability to make law. My sense is that the net of risks and
benefits from administrative adjudication makes internalization
attractive over a variety of dimensions. It is the one system likely to
deliver the consistent, expert, and proportionate response to
financial misconduct and, thus, the most stable balance in investor
protection. Enlarging the SEC's adjudicatory power makes it less
likely that future scandals will lead to the kind of heavy-handed
reaction implicit in portions of Sarbanes-Oxley.
CONCLUSION
Technological innovation poses a problem for all forms of
regulation, notjust securities. Regulatory lag is inevitable when the
pace of change is fast and the subject complicated.9' When that kind
of lag is coupled with a loss of restraint by the class of persons to
be protected, as occurred in securities regulation in the 1990s,
opportunism is almost certain.
In 2003, by virtue of hindsight, that opportunism looks particu-
larly venal and corrupt. A serious attempt to remember what it was
like five years or so ago, however, changes the picture. A survival-of-
the-fittest contest was going on in a variety of product markets, with
the sense that the winners would take much, if not nearly all.
91. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,907-08 (1961); see also Donald C. Langevoort,
Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1319, 1320-21 (1999).
92. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the
Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 333, 405-12 (1990).
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Aggressiveness was celebrated, and investors were enthusiastic to
place their bets on who would prevail. It turns out that many firms
inflated their prospects in search of capital and customers out of
some mixture of greed and fear. For some, the bubble burst
completely.
The purpose of securities regulation is to restrain the worst kind
of insider opportunism and make transparent as much about issuers
as is practicable.93 We have to look hard at each of the so-called
scandals to find out the extent to which the misreporting was driven
by executive selfishness to misappropriate value from investors. To
this extent, harsh remedial intervention is needed. But if we find
more of an excess of competitive zeal in a time of extraordinary
normative uncertainty-aided by the market's own exuberance and
the law's ambivalent signals-the response should be more mea-
sured. Lumping all the rule-breaking into a single tale of corporate
evil makes for bad justice and bad policy.
93. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1055-60 (1995).
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